Reflecting upon reflection: Beyond reflective cycles for study at doctoral level by Talbot, Jon





This work has been submitted to ChesterRep – the University of Chester’s 





Author(s): Jon Talbot  
 
 
Title: Reflecting upon reflection: Beyond reflective cycles for study at doctoral level 
 
 
Date: November 2009 
 
 
Originally given at: International Conference on Professional Doctorates 
 
 
Example citation: Talbot, J. (2009, November). Reflecting upon reflection: Beyond 
reflective cycles for study at doctoral level. Unpublished poster presentation given at 
the International Conference on Professional Doctorates at Cavendish conference 
Centre in London, 9-10 November 2009. 
 
 
Version of item: Given at conference  
 
 
Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10034/116556 
 
(2009) “Reflecting upon reflection; beyond reflective cycles for study at doctoral level”, 
Poster presentation, International Conference on Professional doctorates: Cavendish 
conference Centre, London 9-10th November 
 
Reflecting upon reflection: beyond reflective cycles for study at Doctoral level 
 
 
Dr Jon Talbot 
University of Chester 
Parkgate Road 









The poster presents a case study on the way students on the newly accredited 
Professional Doctorate (DProf) programme at the University of Chester are engaged 
in a deeper, more critical approach to reflective learning. The programme, which 
draws upon over a decade of experience with the use of reflective models, examines 
the issue of progression in respect of reflective learning and contains a critique of 
existing models, where ‘reflection’ is regarded as rational and hence unproblematic. 
 
Context: work based learning and reflective practice at Chester 
 
The University of Chester has been engaged in work based learning (WBL) since 
1998. Its main activity in this respect is the use of a ‘shell’ framework, the Work 
Based and Integrative Studies (WBIS) programme to deliver flexible learning to 
adults in employment. There are many theoretical foundations for the underpinning 
philosophy embedded in WBIS but perhaps the best summary of its principles in 
contained in Brookfield (1998). The framework has currently has just over a 
thousand learners at levels 4-7, mostly studying individually negotiated pathways 
and award titles. In common with many other UK HE institutions Chester uses a 
modular framework; single modules are 20 credit rated (10 CITS). 
 
WBIS is designed to enable the learner to design their own programme relevant to 
their working needs and ensure learning is integrated with practice. Students can 
study modules based around traditional subject disciplines; devise their own 
modules where there is a need to transcend traditional subject boundaries or where 
sufficient demand exists tutors develop new modules in response. WBIS modules 
can be added almost infinitely and there is an internal accreditation process for this 
purpose to enable rapid development.  
 
As far as is practicable within the framework of the University regulations (and their 
own best interests) students begin their studies when they like, submit when ready 
and determine their completion date. All learning is tailored to their needs and as a 
result virtually no WBIS pathway is the same as another; this only usually happens 
when an employer negotiates a pathway on behalf of employees. The one element 
all WBIS students undertake is, at the beginning of their studies, Self Review and 
Negotiation of Learning. In this module, irrespective of level of learning, students 
identify their learning achievements to date and review their learning requirements 
as the basis for identifying their learning pathway. At this stage they also identify 
opportunities for Accreditation of Prior Learning (APL) whether Certificated (APCL) 
or Experiential (APEL). They also complete a formal exercise in reflection, typically 
using a recognised reflective model, such as Gibbs (1998) or Boud et al (1985). 
 
Self Review is a single 20 credit module which performs a number of functions. First, 
it encourages the development of personal responsibility for learning based upon self 
diagnosed need. Second it sensitises individuals to an explicit view of the learning 
process and encourages self analysis of learning preferences. Third, it enables 
individuals to identify learning achievements which can be translated into academic 
credit. Fourth it facilitates the creation of a practical programme of study and exit 
award based upon that analysis. Finally it inculcates the notion of reflective practice 
as the basis not just for the WBIS programme of learning but as the basis of 
continuing and extended lifelong learning.  Within Self Review students complete a 
formal reflective learning exercise, often based upon critical incident analysis. 
Thereafter all assignments produced as part of a WBIS programme of study are 
reflective, with strong emphasis on the application of knowledge. No particular model 
of reflection is advocated but models which seek to deepen reflection by means of 
reference to authoritative sources are strongly encouraged. Typical WBIS 
assignments are therefore a reflective commentary on lived experience or perhaps 
the submission of workplace artefacts (such as reports, charts, notes of meetings 
and so on) alongside a reflective commentary. The specific requirements of the 
WBIS programme has created a distinct community of practice among tutors who 
created and deliver it (Leonard and Talbot 2009). It is from this community that the 
University of Chester’s first Professional Doctoral (DProf) programme has been 
created.  
 
The Chester Professional Doctorate: taking reflection further 
 
The University of Chester validated its Professional Doctorate in the summer of 
2009. The first cohort will be inducted in January 2010 so what follows is an 
indication of some of the thinking which is going into one aspect of it. Unlike WBIS 
where within certain constraints (such as a mandatory Research Methods and 
Project module for a bachelor degree) students are free to create their own learning 
pathway, the DProf is structured, with clear submission dates with the intention 
students will complete within four years. In outline structure it is comprised of 180 
credits at Level 7 and 360 at Level 8. At Level 7 students engage in modules 
designed to prepare them for study at Doctoral level, where the emphasis is on the 
generation of original, practitioner research. 
 
 
The first module students are required to complete is in many ways the most 
important because it introduces students to advanced study in a university setting. 
This module (‘Personal and Professional Review’- 40 credits) is therefore intended to 
perform a similar function to the existing Self Review 
module at other levels on the WBIS programme. Students will identify learning 
achievements, identify the knowledge they intend to generate for Doctoral study and 
identify potential opportunities for APL. In addition they will also be expected develop 
a reflective approach to their learning and study, as is the case with many other 
existing Professional Doctorates (Armsby 2008; Sambrook and Stewart 2008). 
Despite the plethora of literature on reflective learning methods and assessment 
(see Moon 2008 for a good summary) discussions about the application of the notion 
of ‘levelness’ and progression are less prevalent1  
 
 
In this respect, as practitioners, WBIS tutors assess reflective learning at different 
levels without a clear view about how progression occurs in reflective learning. For 
the DProf we have decided it is essential to take a more critical approach to 
reflective learning. In part this is for purely practical reasons. First we anticipate 
many students will have completed a WBIS award and we therefore need to ensure 
there is progressive learning. Second, we also feel that at this level of study, a more 
critical approach is appropriate and the programme of learning is rigorous.  
 
Beyond that there is one other reason which relates to our own practice. Within the 
community of WBIS tutors we like to think there is genuine reflexivity: we are 
interested in our practice but like all practitioners we construct narratives about our 
work and ourselves. One of the stories we tell ourselves is that reflective learning is 
a ‘good thing’ and that we are ‘good’ at it. But like all paradigms, there are puzzles 
within and we are all aware of this. There are some things we know and some things 
we think we know. We know for example, that not all students are especially good at 
reflective learning. For some it can become an exercise in solipsism; for others self 
justification or aggrandisement. For those lacking confidence it can become almost 
masochistic. However we believe that it works well for the majority and that they are 
able to add value to what they do as a result. We believe that largely because of the 
things the students tell us in their assignments but we do not really know it. It is 
convenient for us to think this but because of those Kuhnian puzzles- the awkward 
bits which do not fit the narrative, we are uneasy. So we want to develop a more 
critical approach to reflection and the DProf seems the best place to begin this. The 
starting point for a more critical approach is to engage with the thinking of those who 





1 There are some exceptions to this such as Kember et al (1999); Kember et al 










Critics of reflective learning 
 
 
Many of the theorists of reflective learning make some rather grand claims for what it 
can achieve. Brookfield (1997) for example characterises reflection as challenging 
common sense understandings, deliberately assuming alternative means of 
explaining actions and even a recognition of dominant cultural values underpinning 
actions.   
 
But it also has its critics. Carroll et al (2002) argue that unlike other approaches to 
learning such as Problem Based Learning, there is little consensus on what 
constitutes reflective learning, there is no agreed method for delivering and 
assessing it and little empirical evidence that it alters actions in the real world. One 
exception is the study reported by Gould and Baldwin (2004) where students did 
change as a result of reflective learning but not the organisations they worked in. For 
Harvey and Knight (1995) there is little to distinguish ‘reflection’ from ‘thinking’ and 
that the insights it may provide are likely to be more self affirming than 
transformative. Barnett (1997) argues reflective practice is a socially driven concept 
which may not stimulate real critical reflection. He also reports an interesting small 
survey of his own students undertaking reflective learning practices but who would 
appear to have little idea of what is meant by ‘reflective learning’. He concludes that 
while ‘necessary’, it is ‘on its own an insufficient form of reflection for high levels of 
critical thought, activity and self transformation’ (p103). Focussing on the actions of 
the self does not enable students to fully understand the way in which the concepts 
they use to understand their own actions are in turn, socially constructed…’the 
students inner self is constructed more by external agendas…than by the students 
own personal aspirations, values and hold on the world’ (p100). Other critics, such 
as Greenwood (1993); Hulah (1995); Pryce (2002) and Taylor (2003) make similar 
arguments: most reflection is naïve because those undertaking reflection simply do 
not have the means to identify the world as it is socially constructed. For Taylor 
(2003) the issue is not whether reflective learning is appropriate or not, it is the 
uncritical way in which it is advocated, as if personalised narrative accounts are 
themselves authentic and unproblematic. 
 
Perhaps the most sophisticated critic is Mackintosh (1998). She highlights the 
contribution to theorists of reflective learning such as Dewey, Mezirow and Schon. 
She concludes that only is it unclear what each means by ‘reflection’ but that the 
intellectual rigour demanded may be beyond most people. At a practical level she 
concludes that favoured methods, such as reflective diaries and workshops do not 
generate the kind of deeper thought advocated by theorists. She then quotes studies 
which question the degree to which nurses are able to learn reflectively: Cavanagh 
at al (1995) for example found that of 192 in a sample, only 46% could be regarded 
as reflective learners. Finally she re-states the lack of evidence to support the view 
that reflective learning underpins improved performance. 
 
Another line of attack, which Mackintosh alludes to in respect of the reliability of 
remembered events, is the reliance of reflective learning methods on self reported 
events and self evaluation. The role of memory and its unreliability has been 
commented on by others such as Newell (1992); Newell (1994);Jones (1995) – all 
quoted in Taylor (2003). More recently Rigg and Trehan (2008) have noted how 




Problems with reflective learning: a tutor’s perspective 
 
 
As tutor practitioners we are well aware that many of our students are not reflecting 
in the way many of its advocates claim they should be. It is not unusual to read a 
reflective account which informs the reader that the actions undertaken were the 
best that could be and in addition, they are further justified by reference to leading 
academic theory. Such accounts usually highlight the author’s sterling qualities 
compared with the dismal failings of others. Alternatively but less frequently we read 
that reflection has revealed the depths of the students’ incompetence, especially 
when compared with the nostrums of leading thinkers in the field. Perhaps more 
common than both is a descriptive account of what happened with precious little 
reflection of any description. We certainly recognise the criticism that the tools of 
critical reflection, those concepts students use to make sense of lived experience 
often represents socially constructed ideas over which they have little critical insight. 
We are also aware, from a rationalist perspective, of the invalidity of the self 
reflecting on the self. This is not the same as saying, as some critics do, that there is 
no value in reflective learning because we also see many examples of its power to 
induce genuine fresh thinking. But we think the DProf represents an opportunity to 
facilitate a deeper approach to reflective learning, where the nature of reflection is 
considered more critically. 
 
 
Critical reflection in the Chester DProf 
 
The starting point for our own critical reflections on the way in which we facilitate 
reflective learning is that we recognise the limitations of our current practice where 
students are seen in isolation from the world they inhabit and where the mind is 
regarded as separate from the body. In short we wish to place reflective learning in 
its social and psychological context and more importantly, enable students to see it 
too. Deeper critical and reflective learning demands we examine the linearity of 
reflective learning cycles reflexively. 
 
The first aspect we want doctoral students to address is the socially constructed 
nature of their own knowledge of and understanding of the world. This perspective is 
derived from sociological ‘social constructivism’, which originates from the work of 
Berger and Luckman (1966) who hypothesise that as people and groups interact 
over a period of time they create shared meanings and understandings derived from 
the social roles they occupy. A simple example is the idea of a cash economy. The 
understanding that a coin represents a specific monetary value is created and 
reinforced by countless social interactions which confirm that shared understanding. 
The construction of a social reality, which we assume rather than reflect upon, 
reduces uncertainty and enables us to focus on more important issues. So the 
creation of an economy based upon an abstract but universally shared 
understanding saves us from the complexity and uncertainty of a barter economy. It 
also enables us to shift our understanding of roles and meanings in accordance with 
changing needs and priorities. To take an example of a role, that of ‘university tutor’ 
has specific meanings based on social context at a particular point in time. Full 
participation in the role of say a Work Based Learning tutor is a gradual process they 
term ‘socialisation’. Those familiar with the idea of situated learning might think of the 
same process as moving from ‘peripheral’ to ‘legitimate’ participation but the point is 
that the defining and meaning of that role is a social artefact and that therefore, the 
thoughts and actions which within it are not the product of a disembodied intelligence 
but the result of a multitude of shared and constructed social understandings. 
 
When we as tutors ask students in work to reflect upon their role and actions we are 
not doing so against a background of a nineteenth century industrial economy, we 
are doing so in the context of a globalised, de-industrialised, individualised, 
knowledge based economy in a programme of learning which is similarly post-
industrial and individualised. The world view of students and tutors alike is that of 
inhabitants of that world, using ideas which belong to this time and culture. So the 
first task for those reflecting on our doctoral programme, who in Reich’s (1992) 
terms, are earning a living as ‘symbolic analysts’ is to be able to de-construct their 
own assumptions about their own identity, beliefs and understandings and see 
themselves as socially constructed beings. In this we can claim no particular 
originality. Field (2006) has convincingly demonstrated the links between the post 
industrial economy and the lifelong learning agenda while Fook and Gardner (2007) 
already encourage their students to de-construct their own world view as the basis 
for reflection. 
 
The second aspect we wish to engage with is the students’ understanding of their 
own cognition and here we are drawing upon insights from cognitive psychology (in 
short the ‘science of thinking’) and in particular the way in which we filter experience 
through cognitive processing and the bias this creates in our perception of the world. 
Even if we regard disregard the extent to which we incorporate the views and 
understandings of others and regard ourselves as essential asocial, autonomous 
and authentic our view of the world is at best partial. Cognitive bias describes our 
tendency to make errors of judgement based on cognitive factors- in other words the 
mistakes we all make in our judgements about the world because of the way in 
which our brains work. Or as Levy (1997, p86) expresses it cognitive bias is the 
collective name for the ‘systematic mistakes that derive from limits that are inherent 
in our capacity to process information’. Their function appears to be as a kind of way 
of simplifying complex reality into something we can understand and communicate, 
possibly as an evolutionary adaptation. 
 
At an intuitive level most of us are aware that our own recollections of events may 
not be completely accurate but to imagine this is not really significant (after all, courts 
of law rely on witness accounts) is to significantly under-estimate the degree of likely 
inaccuracy. For those unfamiliar with the idea of cognitive bias, the most striking 
feature is the sheer number of sources of bias and the weight and range of 
supporting empirical evidence. There is only space here to mention a few but there 
are a number of excellent texts on the subject (Ariely 2009; Fine 2007; Piattelli-
Palmarini 1994; Pohl 2004; Sutherland 2007; Tavris and Aronson 2008) 
 
Some of the biases which are likely to affect reflective accounts include the 
introspection bias, fundamental attribution error, hindsight bias. Introspection bias 
describes our propensity to believe that our own introspections are unbiased, unlike 
those of others, which we regard as more likely to be biased. This in turn is based 
upon our own view of ourselves as being ‘better than average’ in terms of our 
possession of desirable traits and fewer undesirable traits. Even when people are 
informed of this ‘halo’ effect, their views are beliefs and perceptions are not altered 
(Pronin and Kugler 2007). The Confirmation bias describes the tendency to find 
information, remember the past or interpret events in ways which supports pre-
existing beliefs (Wason and Johnson Laird 1972)). Hindsight bias describes the way 
in which we regard past events as having an inevitability about them which was often 
not evident at the time. In layman’s terms hindsight bias is ‘wise after the event’ – 
over emphasising our ability to foresee future events based on (inaccurate) 
reflections on the past (Jones 1995; Hoffrage and Pohl 2003). The Fundamental 
attribution error describes our tendency to use personality based explanations for the 
behaviour of others and under-estimate situational explanations. By contrast we tend 
to interpret our own actions in the light of the situations we find ourselves in rather 
than in terms of our own preferences and beliefs (Ross 1977). So our observation 
that someone is an alcoholic because of an ‘addictive personality’ whilst discounting 
their status as a victim of child abuse who has suffered relationship breakdown may 
reflect our own tendency to moralise rather than a reasoned view of behaviour based 
on ‘common sense’. 
 
Finally, l will mention one other example of cognitive bias, mostly because it is so 
well known and also likely to affect accounts reflective learners produce- cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger 1957). Cognitive dissonance is the feeling of discomfort we 
experience when we hold two or more contradictory ideas or cognitions 
simultaneously. The theory holds that to reduce this discomfort we will change, 
rationalise or modify those beliefs. For example it is possible some MPs may be 
dimly aware that as trusted public servants they should not claim excessive 
expenses. Yet they may be able to rationalise claims to have their moat cleaned out 
at public expense by assuming anyone else in their situation would do the same 
thing. So when the public express some disagreement with this assessment it might 
seem reasonable to claim they are ‘only jealous’. A great deal of empirical evidence 
has been accumulated to support the theory in the fifty or so years since it was first 
outlined and it is entirely reasonable to expect to see examples of it in reflective 
accounts of experience. 
 
De-constructing reflective cycles: reflexive reflection  
 
To date our experience with reflective learning has been with the use of reflective 
cycles where the self is regarded as socially and psychologically autonomous, 
capable of being both the neutral investigator and object of study. For the doctoral 
programme the aim is to adopt a more reflexive approach, sensitising learners (it is 
hoped) to see the self from inside and out by using insights derived from sociology 
and psychology, such as social constructionism, social constructivism and cognitive 
bias. The purpose is to question the neat circularity of the various reflective models 
and the idea of progressive learning- that we can really learn from experience in the 
way such models suggest. This de-construction of a progressive, linear model of the 
world aims to arrive at truth by questioning a narrative. To understand why is not 
because we are simply attracted to a progressive line of thought. It is because we 
are concerned with reflection to ensure that as far as possible the reflective learning 
of our students reflects the truth as far as is possible. In order to do this we have to 
confront the power linear narratives have to attract and subsequently mislead us. 
 
To understand the seduction we only have to contrast the events in our own lives 
with the narratives we routinely see in fiction. In the latter, constructed narratives 
virtue is routinely rewarded, love found, cause follows effect, tension resolved. By 
contrast our own lives are considerably messier: bad people often do very well, not 
everyone finds true love and there appears to be a large degree of randomness to 
the world. There are no endings in real life, save death and many would contest that. 
Despite knowing constructed narratives are not 'true' we find they have a powerful 
grip on our imagination, as circular/ linear/ progressive models of reflective learning 
do. They may not accurately describe the world as we really experience it- they are 
instead a powerful fictionalised narrative. We wish to develop a more reflexive 
approach, based upon a deeper understanding of the way in which we understand 
the world to form the basis for a re-constructed account of lived experience. De-
constructing this type of narrative as the basis for re-construction represents a post-
modern approach to reflective learning and in this enterprise we are not alone: Fook 





The basis for our evolving approach to critical reflection is one which accepts the 
idea of human understanding and therefore critical reflection as bounded rationality 
(Simon 1957). That is we accept that reflective thinking can and often is rational but 
that rationality is circumscribed. The thoughts we regard as our own are in fact social 
constructs created in a particular social context which not only limit our ability to 
make sense of the world but also define it. Further, even within that constraint, our 
ability to perceive lived experience as it actually occurs is hampered by the 
limitations of our own cognitive processes. A truly reflective approach to learning 
from experience should, if only at advanced levels, recognise these constraints. 
 
Moreover there are means by which we can assist learners to see beyond the 
shackles of the pre-constructed world and limited cognition- by means of explicit 
emphasis on critical thinking- ‘that mode of thinking- about any subject, context or 
problem- in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skilfully 
taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual 
standards upon them” (Paul, Fisher and Nosich 1992, p4). That is thinking about 
thinking – also sometimes known as metacognition. There is no shortage of texts 
including Fisher (2001) and Moon (2008a) both of which provide a broad 
introduction. Others such as Alfaro- Le Fevre (1999); Cottrell (2005) and Jones-





Summary and conclusion 
 
The Professional Doctorate programme at the University of Chester incorporates 
reflective learning which aims to go beyond existing approaches which emphasise 
the use of linear/ circular models. The aim is to sensitise learners both to the socially 
constructed nature of their world view and the limitations of their own cognition. By 
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